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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
A. L. REESE,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
THOMAS R. HARPER,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF
RESPONDENT
Civil No. 8836

ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent desires to call to the attention of the
Court certain additions to and corrections in the statement
of facts in appellant's brief.
Before referring to the facts, however, appellant suggests in his brief (page 3) that justice could not be obtained before a jury in Box Elder County, and infers that
the decision against appellant in the lower court was
rendered only because of the prejudice of the jury.
Respondent answers that if appellant did not feel
justice could be obtained before a Box Elder County jury~
it was his privilege as well as his duty to move for a change
of venue. Failing in this we declare that appellant should
not now be heard to complain that a Box Elder County
jury will not act impartially and justly.
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Appellant states on page 4 of his brief that "defendant's case was tried on the theory of a difference between
the terms of the listing agreement and the Receipt and
Agreement." This is not a true and correct statement of
respondent's theory, as will be apparent in the statement
of points and the argument.
Respondent on December 24, 1956, listed his dry
farm for sale with Atlas Realty Company through Jesse
L. Thompson, a real estate salesman for appellant who
was doing business as Atlas Realty Company. Respondent
did not contact appellant regarding the sale of his farm
( R. 158) but rather, the lead on said listing was given to
appellant by Ezra Zollinger ( R. 152, 153, 200) who later
became appellant's "ready, willing and able purchaser."
Five days after listing his property, respondent was
handed a Receipt and Agreement (Ex. 1) in appellant's
office in Logan, Utah, which had been signed by Jesse L.
Thompson as agent for respondent. Appellant's name
does not appear on the Receipt and Agreement to Purchase, nor does the name Atlas Realty Co.
There was no discussion had with regard to the terms
of the sale agreement, pruticularly with regard to the paytnent of the mortgages, prior to the time I-espondent was
handed the Receipt and Agreen1ent (R. 35).
Appellant testified that there was some discussion
( Il.235). However, cross exan1ination of Jesse L. Thompson ( R. 248) revealed that he had previously testified that
the 1nortgages were never mentioned until after the Re-
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ceipt and Agreement had been signed by respondent and
the broker, or appellant, was getting the final papers ready
for signature:

Q. Do you recall having your deposition taken be· A.

fore Mr. Parker on the twelfth of June in the
District Court in Logan, Utah?
There's a deposition made.

Q. Do you recall at that time, Mr. Thompson, of
having this question put to you: "Did you know
that Mr. Harper had mortgages on the property?"
And your answer: "Those didn't come out until
the broker was getting things ready. No, no
mortgages were ever mentioned." Do you recall
making a statement of that sort?
A. I must have done if it's in there.
Respondent, therefore, had no notice or indication from
anything told him by appellant, that the terms of the sale
would be any different, at least in essence, than the terms
of employment agreed upon with appellant in the listing
agreement (Ex. 5). ·
It is true, and respondent so stated (R. 163) that
before signing the Receipt and Agreement to Purchase he
glanced at the parts that had been hand written, saw the
figure $30,000 and "encumbrances: none" and thought
that was all he had coming and that it looked good enough
to him (R. 162, 163). However, "encumbrances: none"
meant to the respondent, as his testimony shows ( R. 189),
that it was the $30,000 which was not to be encumbered.
Appellant states on page 7 of his brief that respondent testified that the amount of the mortgages was $8,500.
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This ignores the fact that respondent also testified (R. 187)
that there was other indebtedness in addition to the
$8,500 land mortgage, and that appellant himself testified
( R. 231) that he knew there was another obligation. There
was, therefore, mortgage indebtedness of approximately
$15,000 against respondent's property, which, together
with the $30,000 figure in the Receipt and Agreement,
equals the approximately $45,000 for which respondent
always intended to sell his property.
As soon as respondent ·realized no ·provision had been
made for ·the mortgages ·in the Receipt and Agreement
he went to Mr. -Zollinger,the purchaser, to warn him about
them (R. 176), and learned then for the first time that
he would have to pay off the mortgages himself, that by
the terms of the Receipt and Agreement he would have
to give the purchaser a clear title ( R. 176)
Respondent then made an effort to work out an
agreement of sale with the purchaser, as appellant points
out on page 8 of his brief. This he was not able to do.
The Escrow Agreement (Ex. 9) was prepared under
the following circumstances ( R. 205) :

Q. Now, in the preparing of the escrow agreement,
I believe you (·Mr. Zollinger) had that written
up, and you told Mr. Reese what forms you
wanted in that escrow agreement; isn't that.right?
A.

That's right.

Q. And then they wrote it in for you. They filled
in the terms for you?
A.

Yes, that's right.
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Q. Mr. Harper
A.

wasn~t

there, was he, at that time?

No.

This Escrow Agreement was presented to respondent and
Mrs. Harper several days after the signing of the Receipt
and Agreement. Both refused to sign.
Appellant submits on page 7 of his brief that the
Escrow Agreement contains a full description of the terms
of the Receipt and Agreement. However, the briefest of
examinations of the two instruments reveals that they
differ in several material respects. Orner Call, Esq. of
Brigham City, representing Mr. Harper in the matter of
the Escrow Agreement, wrote to Judge M. C. Harris and
informed him that because of these differences Mr. Harper
would not sign the Escrow Agreement. During the trial
Mr. Call testified as to the exact nature of these differences
( R. 277, 278, 279, 281, 283).
Appellant remarks (page 7) that Mr. Harper was
invited, through his attorney, to prepare a type of contract
agreeable to Harper. In view of the additional terms Mr.
Zollinger was insisting upon, and the argument about
price, this would obviously have been a futile act on respondent's part.
There is a conflict in the evidence as to whether or
not Mrs. Harper, a joint tenant with respondent, was
present when respondent signed the Receipt and Agreement to Purchase, appellant testifying that she was and
that she urged Mr. Harper to sign ( R. 225, 226), and repondent and Mrs. Harper testifying that she was not.
(R. 163, 195).
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Appellant proves to be confused as to Mrs. Harper's
presence. At one time he testified ( R. 223) that she was
there and heard the details of the sale. At a later time
he testified ( R. 230) that she was not there when the
details were discussed.
However, it would seem to be immaterial whether
Mrs. Harper was present or not when the Receipt and
Agreement was signed by respondent, though the logical
conclusion would be that she was not, as it cannot be
controverted that she did not sign the purchase agreement,
or any other paper agreeing to the offer to purchase her's
and respondent's property.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The appellant, as respondent's trusted agent, had
a duty to disclose to respondent all essential facts of the
transaction and terms of the agreement, in which duty
he failed.

2. The Jury in a Special \'erdict found that ~fr.
Reese (appellant) did not fairly disclose to ~lr. Harper
(respondent) all material facts \\~hich ~1r. Reese knew of
and acquired concerning this transaction, which verdict
the trial cotnt adopted and approved.
3. Appellant failed to exercise the reasonable skill
and diligence required of an agent in the interests of his
principal.
Appellant did not produce a buyer who was
ready, willing and able to buy what the seller (respondent)
had to sell.
4.
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-95. Appellant did not secure a valid contract for
the sale of respondenfs property, as required by the terms
of his employment, nor were terms in contemplation of
a binding contract ever agreed upon.
6. The Receipt and Agreement to Purchase relied
upon herein by appellant does not set forth the amount
to be paid as the broker's commission.
7. The Court did not err in making its additional
Findings of Fact Nos. 7 and 8.
8. The Court did not err in making its Findings of
Fact No.4.
ARGUMENT
1. Appellant, as respondent's trusted agent, had a
duty to disclose to respondent all essential facts of the
transaction and terms of the agreement, in which duty he
failed.
The Jury in a Special Verdict found that Mr.
Reese (appellant) did not fairly disclose to Mr. Harper
(respondent) all material facts which Mr. Reese knew
of and acquired concerning this transaction, which verdict
the trial court adopted and approved.
2.

The law in Utah specifically holds that the relationship between a broker and his principal is a fiduciary
relationship, and that the broker must make a full disclosure of all material facts to his principal:
"Equity regards and treats this relation (of principal and agent) in the same general manner, and
with nearly the same strictness, as that of trustee and
beneficiary.
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"Any unfairness, any underhanded dealing, any
use of knowledge not communicated to the principal,
any lack of the perfect good faith which equity requires, renders the transaction voidable. ( 2 Porn. Eq.
Jur. section 959 )" Burt & Carlquist Co. vs. Marks
et al., (Utah, 1918} 177 P. 224.
"As is noted in American Jurisprudence: ( 4 Am.
Jur., Brokers, Sec. 142):
The faithful discharge of his duties is a condition
precedent to any recovery upon the part of a broker
for the services he has rendered his principal. Thus, he
is not entitled to compensation if he fails to disclose
to his principal any personal knowledge which he
possesses relative to matters which are or may be
material to his employer;Js interests.;J;J Reich vs.
Christopulos (Utah, 1953) 256 P. 2d 238.
''The Rule that nondisclosure of facts does not
constitute fraud does not apply whe:re- there is an
active concealment of facts. This is a fraud.;J, Bennett
vs. Bowen (Utah, 1925) 238 P. 240.
The weight of the evidence is that appellant failed to
disclose to respondent who was to pay the mortgages.
The Jury so found and considered this failure to be
material.
Appellant cites the cases of Johnson vs. Allen (Utah,
1945) 158 P. 2d 134, and Garff Realty Co. vs. Better
Buildings, Inc. (Utah, 1951) 234 P. 2d 842. There are
certain basic differences between the facts in those and
in the present case which should be pointed out.
In the case of Johnson vs. Allen (supra) the question
of fraud arose upon the signing of a listing agreement.
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The Supreme Court agreed with Cooley in his book on
Torts, 3d Ed., p. 933, that the ways of fraud are many
and that the law must follow into all of them to rescue
the victim, even to having to rescue one who has signed
a contract without reading it, and been misled thereby.
However, a fiduciary relationship must exist, and the
signer must be disarmed from reading the contract. The
Court then holds that the signing of a listing agreement
is an arms length transaction between a broker and seller
-that no relationship of trust exists.
In the present case the listing agreement had been
signed and agency established between appellant and
respondent, as counsel for appellant stated during one of
the pre trials in this case ( Tr. 69). Any dealings thereafter between respondent and appellant, including the
presentation of the Receipt and Agreement to Purchase
to respondent for his signature, were governed by the
principles of the fiduciary relationship. Johnson vs. Allen
(supra) is therefore not in point.
The Supreme Court in Gar££ Realty Co. vs. Better
Buildings, Inc. (supra) found there was no evidence to
show a fiduciary relationship between the broker and the
seller, and that no plea of mistake, fraud or overreaching
had been entered-the question was purely contractural.
In such a case the Court rightly held that:
"A person who, having the capacity and an opportunity to read a contract, is not mislead as to its
contents and who sustains no confidential relationship
to the other party cannot avoid the contract on the
ground of mistake if he signs it without reading it, at
least in the absence of special circumstances excusing
his failure to read it."
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The evidence in the present case shows that respondent sustained a confidential relationship to appellant,
that he was misled as to the contents of the paper he
signed, and that the special circumstances excusing his
failure to read were that he had a right to rely on his
agent to disclose the terms of the agreement, especially
when they differed so considerably from the terms of his
contract of employment. Furthermore, there was entered
a plea of mistake, fraud or bad faith, and evidence introduced to that plea. Again, the Garff Realty Co. case is
not in point.
The attention of the Court is invited to the following
testimony by ~1r. Zollinger: (R. 201)

Q. How did they pressure you, 1\Ir. Zollinger? (to
make an offer for respondenfs property)
A.

Oh, they just said it was out there and I was the
logical person to buy it, and I says I didn't want
it, it was poor land, and they says, "''1ell, make
an offer." I finallv made a $25,000 offer and
they said, oh, they couldn't get a price, they
thought they could get it for thirty. (Italics ours).
They said, "Will you go thirty?" I said, well I
didn't know. I didn't want it.

And later on: (R. 257)

Q. Well, you say you didn't want the land before
then. You didn't want the land, why did you
buy it then?
A.

We didn't want it very bad. Twentv-five thousand dollars, it was a buy, good buy; yes. A fellow don't buy a poor buy. I didn't want it very
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bad, so ..I offered a low price for it. If I had
wanted- it bad, maybe I'd have paid $45,000, but
I didn't want it bad.
And another statement by Mr. Zollinger (R. 255)
A.

He called· me up three times, and I just laughed
at him, and finally he said, "Well, come on in,
I think that he'll probably sell for less than that."
(Italics ours.) So I made him an offer of $25,000.

This testimony is particularly interesting in view of
an important Arizona decision which holds:
"The law requires that a real estate broker employed to sell land must act in entire good faith and
in the interest of his employer, and if he induces the
prospective buyer to believe that the property can be
bought for less, he thereby fails to discharge that
duty and forfeits all his rights to claim commission
and compensation for his work.
"There is no doubt that the above proposition
of law is correct. A real estate agent owes the duty
of utmost good faith and loyalty to his principal."
Haymes vs. Rogers (Arizona, 1950) 219 P. 2d 339,
17ALR 2d 296 (Annotated)
3. Appellant failed to exercise the reasonable skill
and diligence required of an agent in the interests of his
principal.
The Utah Supreme Court upheld in Reich, et ux. vs.
Christopulos, et al. (supra) the general principle that
in undertaking the sale of property for his principal, the
broker has a duty to represent his interest in good faith,
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to discharge it with reasonable skill and diligence and to
disclose to him all pertinent facts which would materially
affect his interest.
Did appellant exercise reasonable skill and diligence
on behalf of respondent? Mr. S. L. Jeppson, a real estate
salesman, was called to the stand on behalf of respondent
and qualified as an expert in the field of selling real estate.
The Court is invited to consider the following testimony
by Mr. Jeppson (R. 268):

Q. 111 ask you, Mr. Jeppson, give you a hypothetical
question here. If a person came to you, gave
you a listing on a piece of property for $45,000
and you contacted three people with regard to
selling it and one of them indicated that he
wasn't interested under any circumstances because it was too small a farm; another made a
very small offer of around five dollars an acre
or something, which would amount to much less
than the listing of $45,000; and a third person
offered the sum of $30,000; these three people
were contacted within a period of five days, one
of these days being a holiday, Christmas; would
you feel, is it your opinion in drawing up a contract for a $30,000 deal on that property, that
you had used reasonable diligence to get the best
price possible for that piece of property?
A.

I'd never take the time to draw up a contract on
that kind of an offer without first consulting the
seller to know that he's interested in such a thing
as that.

Q.

But do you have an opinon as to whether or not
those factors would be using reasonable diligence
to get the highest price possible for your seller?
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A.

Not the way I work it. I wouldn't feel like I had
done any thing. (Italics ours ) .

And on cross examination ( R. 270-, 271 ) :

Q. Now, if you had Mr. Harper's signature on that
(earnest money receipt and agreement to purchase) and Mr. Zollinger, who was paying cash
incidentally for this property, would you discourage Mr. Harper from taking it?
A.

Well I believe I would at that price.

Q. You would?
A.

Yeah.

4. Appellant did not produce a buyer who was
ready, willing and able to buy what the seller (respondent)
had to sell.
Appellant alleges in his statement of the facts (page 3)
that he produced a buyer who was ready, willing and able
to buy on terms other than the listing agreement, which
modified terms respondent agreed to when he signed the
Receipt and Agreement to Purchase.
A study of the facts and testimony, together with an
analysis of what those "other terms" were, supports respondent's argument that appellant did not produce, as
he claims, a ready, willing and able buyer.
It was a matter of record that respondent's wife was
a joint tenant with respondent in the property listed for
sale. Therefore, though respondent represented that he
had the authority to sell his wife's interest as well as his
own on the terms and conditions of sale set forth in the
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listing agreement, there was no such representation in
respondent's signing of the Receipt and Agreement to
Purchase. Her consent would be necessary as to the new
terms. She did not give it.
This principle of law is accepted by the Utah Supreme
Court in Little vs. Gorman (Utah, 1911) 141 P. 321, where
it was held that when the wife refused to accept a new
offer, the original terms of sale were not modified and
thus the brokers were not entitled to recover their commission because "they failed to produce a purchaser who
was willing to purchase the property on the terms proposed and submitted."
.
Inasmuch as, according to the Rule of Little vs.
Gorman (supra) respondent could not commit the joint
tenancy of his wife to the sale without her consent, which
consent she never gave, either orally or in writing, the
most respondent could possibly be considered to have
committed himself to sell by the c;c;other terms" of the
Receipt and Agreement to Purchase was his undivided
one-half interest.
The following question was submitted to appellant's
proposed purchaser, Mr. Zollinger ( R. 153) :

Q. Were you, at the time you signed this agreement,
Mr. Zollinger, willing to purchase a one-haH interest in this property in Hansel Valley for the
$30,000 listed in this agreement?
A.

Why, no. Why buy one-half for $30,000?

5. Appellant did not secure a valid contract for the
sale of respondent's property, as required by the terms
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of his contract of employment, nor were terms in contemplation of a binding contract ever agreed upon.
The listing agreement signed by respondent states
that appellant was to be entitled to a commission "if a valid
contract be made for the sale or exchange thereof before
the expiration of this agreement."'
The Utah Supreme Court has held that:
"A broker who was employed by a special contract. .. can recover only under his special contract,
and cannot recover for procuring a purchaser ready,
willing, and able to buy... as would be the case if
his employment were general.
"Where, by the contract of employment, the commission is made dependent upon certain conditions or
contingencies, as upon the actual consummation of a
sale. . . these stipulations will govern and a fulfillment of performance of the prescribed conditions is
generally essential to the right to compensation
(Murphy vs. W. & W. Live Stock Co., Wyoming, 189
857"). Watson vs. Odell et al., (Utah, 1921) 198
P. 772
The Receipt and Agreement was signed, of course,
by appellant and respondent, but it certainly was not a
valid contract, nor was it considered by the parties to be
the final agreement.
A later Utah case (Hoyt vs. Wasatch Homes, 1953,
261 P. 2d 927) holds that a Receipt and Agreement to
Purchase may be sufficient to base a broker's commission.
However, the circumstances there were so completely
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different as to take the case out of the general rule. The
earnest money receipt had been signed by all the parties,
and thereafter, after much discussing and negotiating, a
definite understanding was reached and set forth in a
memorandum. The Court especially remarked about the
considerable effort the broker had put forth in working
with the parties, and held that the seller's later refusal to
go through with the deal amounted to bad faith.
The facts in the present case do not bring it within
the exception of Hoyt vs. Wasatch Homes. The general
rule still applies to appellant who must therefore fulfill
the terms of his special contract of employment and secure
a valid contract for the sale of respondent's property before he would be entitled to his commission. This he did
not do.
Appellant contends that a valid contract in the form
of an escrow agreement was presented to respondent and
his wife which contained a ''full description of the terms,"
and which respondent and his wife were not justified in
refusing to sign for the reason, apparently, that respondent
made no specific objection to the price, but only to other
differences.
The theory appellant thus seems to be urging on the
Court in this particular point is that since the purchaser
was ready, willing and able to purchase for a certain price
set forth in a preliminary receipt and agreement to purchase, and since respondent made no specific objection
to the price, but attempted to work out an agreement
with the purchaser, those other differences cannot be
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held to justify respondent and his wife in refusing to sign
the Escrow Agreement, and therefore appellant should
recover his commission.
The law does not support appellant's theory. On the
contrary, if the terms of the proferred final contract are
different from those authorized by the seller, either in an
original contract of employment or in a preliminary purchase agreement signed subsequent to the listing agreement:
"the broker can lay no claim to his commissions.
This is true even though there is but a slight variance between the contract tendered by the broker
and that authorized by his employer. Thus, if the
person produced by a broker is willing to purchase
at the price set by the employer of the latter but is
not willing to pay such price in the exact manner
prescribed... the latter is not entitled to his commission. . . The fact that the contract negotiated is
more advantageous than that which the broker was
authorized to enter into, does not alter the operation
of the rule . . . " 8 Am. Jr., Brokers, Sec. 176.
The Escrow Agreement may have contained a full description of the terms upon which Mr. Zollinger was willing
to purchase respondent's property-it obviously did not
contain a description of either the terms of the original
listing agreement or of the Receipt and Agreement to
Purchase. Respondent and his wife, with perfect right,
refused to sign the Escrow Agreement, and appellant's
right to a commission was therefore not earned.
6. The Receipt and Agreement to Purchase relied
upon herein by appellant does not set forth the amount
to be paid as the broker's commission.
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Respondent submits that appellant cannot recover
in this case on the basis of the Receipt and Agreement to
Purchase for the reason that said agreement does not
set forth the amount to be paid as the broker's commission,
and the law in Utah does not permit a broker to recover
for his services unless the agreement for a commission
is set forth in writing. Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
Statute of Frauds: 25-5-4 ( 5).
Appellant cannot resort to other writings. A Washington court has declared, in a case where the amount of
the commission has been left blank, that resort must be
made to other writings or oral testimony to determine
the amount to be paid and that this, according to numerous decisions, could not be done. (Black vs. Milliken,
1927, 255 P. 101)
It was not a mutual mistake that could be corrected.
In the case of Vogel vs. Ensor (Indiana, 131 N. E. 416),
the contention was that the percentage of commission
was omitted by mutual mistake of the parties, and that
the contract could be reformed so as to insert the proper
figures in the blank space, but the court was of the opinion
that such relief was precluded by a proper application of
the Statute of Frauds.
7. The Court did not err in making its additional
Findings of Fact Nos. 7 and 8.
Appellant suggests in his argument (pages 11, 12-~
that one of the questions of fact in this case is respondent's
mental capacity to contract. This is not so, nor is this the
issue referred to in the trial judge's Findings of Fact Nos.
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7 and 8. The Court, after hearing respondent's testimony
and observing respondent during the trial, concluded that
the mental shortcomings of the respondent, which were
or should have been apparent to appellant, imposed upon
appellant a degree of care toward respondent, within the
fiduciary relationship, which the appellant did not fulfill.
The trial court made no finding whatsoever regarding
respondent's mental or physical capacity to contract, but
simply found that, in view of the evidence and his observation of respondent, the respondent's mental capacity
and physical condition were such that appellant owed to
respondent a degree of care which he failed to exercise.
We submit that this was a proper and well supported
finding.
8. The Court did not err in making its Finding of
Fact Nos. 4.
Appellant criticises the trial judge's Finding of Fact
No.4 on the ground that by finding that it was defendant's
(respondent's) interest, intent and desire to receive the
sum of $30,000 clear to him, the Court was attempting to
"reform" the instrument in question. The trial court was
doing no such thing. This is obviously not a suit for
specific performance. The Court made no finding as
to how the contract should have read, but merely found
that respondent was mistaken and misled as to the terms
of the contract, and that his mistake was induced by the
failure on the part of appellant to show the requisite good
faith toward his principal and disclose to him material
facts concerning the offer he had obtained for the sale of
his property. This would seem to be a highly proper
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finding when a plea of mistake, fraud, or bad faith had
been entered by respondent, and evidence offered in support of that plea.
CONCLUSIONS
For the reasons set forth herein, respondent submits
that the decision of the trial court should be affirmed and
that respondent should be granted his costs herein:
That the relationship between appellant and respondent was a fiduciary relationship and that appellant
failed in his duty to make disclosure to respondent of
certain material facts in the agreement he submitted to
respondent.
1.

2. That the Jury in a Special Verdict found that
appellant did not fairly disclose to respondent all material
facts regarding the transaction, particularly with regard
to who was to pay the mortgages, which verdict was
adopted and approved by the trial judge.
3. That appellant failed to exercise reasonable skill
and diligence in his services to respondent as his trusted
agent.
4. That appellant did not secure a valid contract
for the sale of respondent's property, as required by the
terms of appellant's contract of employment; nor was
there ever any agreement as to terms and price arrived
at between respondent and the purchaser.
5. That appellant failed to produce a purchaser who
was ready, willing and able to purchase :espondent's

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-23-

property; that the Escrow Agreement, purporting to contain a full description of the terms of the Receipt and
Agreement to Purchase was in fact so completely different
in its terms and conditions that respondent and his wife
had a perfect right to refuse to sign the same.
6. That the Receipt and Agreement to Purchase
relied upon herein by appellant as showing appellant to
have completed a service for respondent, does not set
forth the amount to be paid as the broker's commission,
and that appellant cannot, therefore, recover a commission
thereon.
7. That the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were, in all respects, proper and well
supported by the evidence.
We submit that the decision of the lower Court
should be affirmed.
Respectfully Submitted:
OLSEN & CALDERWOOD
SHERMA HANSEN
Attorneys for Respondent
and Defendant.
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